Real World Attacks in Action

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Online 6 Register 25

Total **5138**

Scans **1651**

SSN **2822339**

780 Paypal 28132

Paypal Credit cards **28132 655533**

Balance \$0

₩ Shop

♣ SSN

Filter




SSN: 2822339												
#	Seller	First name	Middle name	Last name	Street address	Home phone	City	State	Zip code	Year of birth	Cost	Action
380	admin	Andy	J	Leiker	7338 Kenton	XXX-XXX-0006	Shawnee	KS	66227	1976	\$1.40	BUY
506	admin	Jonathan	Duran	Noel	506 N Henry St Upper APT	XXX-XXX-9511	Bay City	MI	48706	1985	\$1.40	BUY
520	admin	Marquesa	Nicole	Colwell	264 Greenway Drive	XXX-XXX-4117	Scottsburg	IN	47170	1983	\$1.40	BUY
523	admin	BRENDA	MARCELL	GRUBBS	10600 MARS HILL ROAD	XXX-XXX-6868	BAUXITE	AR	72011	1948	\$1.40	BUY
534	admin	john	e	reese	2517 old congo rd	XXX-XXX-4377	Benton	AR	72019	1979	\$1.40	BUY
563	admin	Jeffery	Alan	Bustamante	3378 Burton Chapel Rd	XXX-XXX-9186	Yanceyville	NC	27379	1973	\$1.40	BUY
574	admin	eric	eugene	rhymer	9225 styers ferry rd	XXX-XXX-1980	Clemmons	NC	27012	1983	\$1.40	BUY



Understand the Intent

- Malware has a ultimate 'business purpose'
- Functionality is specific to that purpose
- Co-infection is the norm, not the exception
 - Purpose may shift when target is acquired
- Functionality can be extended
 - Exfiltration
 - Command & Control
 - Post-Operation
- Attackers understand defense strategy
 - Circumvention is trivial








Circumventing Traditional Security Controls

- Attackers understand technical/organizational capabilities and defense tactics
- Circumvention of traditional controls is automated
 - Replace/substitute when detected
 - Daily campaigns with differing attributes
- Most organizations **do not** properly handle, classify or understand what they encounter
 - Rely solely on one isolated technology
 - Wrongly assume that removal is enough







IPS





URL Filtering/Proxy Endpoint Security



Commodity Malware: SaaS

- Reseller Model
 - No direct interaction with creator
- Purchase through trusted 3rd party escrow
 - BitCoin, WebMoney, Ukash, Skrill, Perfect Money
- Hosted or delivered (Binary & Backend)
 - Commercial Software Protection
 - ionCube PHP Encoder used to domain/time lock
 - Hard-coded backend location
 - Change of backend requires new binary + cost
- Modules, add-on's, custom development
 - Scaled pricing
 - Example: DDoS module









Ransomware: SaaS Advertisement

Private software SyndicateS sale:

- WinLocker software to lock Windows OS (US, EU, can work without admin rights). 1500\$ (build) rebuild free
- CryptoLocker software for file encryption in Windows OS. 2000\$ (build)
 rebuild free
- Dropper DLL run DLL in memory. 1500\$ (build) rebuild 50\$
- Non-resident Loader without admin rights. Run up to 3 files. Size is about
 7 KB. 1000\$ builder
- Customization is available. Optionally builders are sold upon agreement.
 Source code as well. All details in Jabber.



RIG Exploit Kit: SaaS Example



RIG exploit kit \$50 Day | \$200 Week | \$700 Month

« on: February 07, 2015, 07:32:58 PM:

Are pleased to introduce you to RIG exploits v2.0

- -Work On all WinOS 32 / 64bi
- -Bypass UAC on exploits
- -Fast cleaning + cleaning on request
- -Keep Large volumes of traffic, no traffic limits
- -We provide always clean and trust domains with automatic check on the blacklist
- -We use CVE-2013-7331 for detect and stop AV or virtual machines.
- -API with automatic delivery

Each account has a 2 stream and can ship 2 different exe

Current exploits:


- Java: CVE-2012-0507
- Java: CVE-2013-2465
- ✓ IE7-8-9: CVE-2013-2551
- ✓ IE10:CVE-2013-0322
- Flash:CVE-2014-0497
- ✓ Flash:CVE-2015-0311
- ✓ Silverlight: CVE-2013-0074

An average rate of 10-20%

- Reseller Model
- Proxy architecture
- Landing page redirects into exploit core
- 2 EXE's per flow
- CVE-2013-7331 XMLDOM ActiveX Control Vulnerability leveraged to enumerate all installed Antivirus software
- RIG iterates over installed plug-ins and versions to find appropriate exploit
- 10-20% advertised effective rate per hit



Nuclear Exploit Kit



Nuclear Exploit kit (VIP accommodation)

- + Flexible filtering / informative statistics
- + Net exploits / rapid addition of new
- + Accommodation on a dedicated server
- + Periodically adding 1day

Punches + any vulnerable version of the browser (Chrome. FF, IE, Opera)

+ Reasonable price (does not affect the quality of service)

Nuclear Exploit kit (PRIVAT version) * Limited set

- + Flexible filtering / informative statistics
- + New exploits / rapid addition of new
- + Accommodation on a dedicated server
- + Periodically adding 1day


Punches + any vulnerable version of the browser (Chrome. FF, IE, Opera)

- + Has an HTML extradition
- + FLASH Banners for advertising. (Swf)
- * Works under the allow = never
- + There are no analogues on the market



CTB-Locker Affiliate Panel

- Price Rules
- Payouts
- Statistics
- Installs
- Support
- API



CTB-Locker Affiliate: Price Rules

CTB-Locker affiliate server.									08:20:25	
Home	Price rules	Payouts	Stats	Installs	Get EXE	Support	User messages	API		
No rules	defined									
Country co Comment: Add rule			and	SubID= <mark>*</mark>	and Size	e> <mark>0</mark>	Mb or files => Price	:		
Default unl	lock price in BTO	0.6	Save							
Defaul price is used when no rule matches. 0.6 BTC = 138 USD. Your affiliate reward is 0.42 BTC = 96 USD										



Analysis of a Campaign: Upatre & Dyre

Spam Email

• From: (random)

Subject: Access All Areas Invoice

Attachment: invoice.zip

VirusTotal Analysis Result: 1/57



HTTP GET: checkip.dyndns.org

HTTP GET: 181.189.152.131/2602uk21/ADMIN-PC/0/61-SP1/0/KGBFDEBEJBFEL

HTTP GET: alalihospital.com/ar/file/hone.pdf (data) COMPROMISED SITE

HTTP GET: 181.189.152.131/2602uk21/ADMIN-PC/41/7/4/

TLS: 194.28.191.217:443 TLS: Subject='C=CN, ST=ST...'

TLS: 79.143.44.82:443 TLS: Subject='C=CN, ST=ST...'

HTTP GET: 5.104.109.197/ml1from2.tar

Final Payload

YvxRoVPD.exe

VirusTotal Analysis Result: 0/57





Analysis of a Campaign: Upatre & Dyre

- Spam Email
 - From: (random)
 - Subject: a1b2cDe3 Your Quotation matching /[0-9A-Za-z{:]{8}/
 - Attachment: a1b2cDe3.zip
 - VirusTotal Analysis Result: 3/56
- User Execution
 - HTTP GET: checkip.dyndns.org
 - HTTP GET: 141.105.141.87/3103uk11/DSHOUSE/0/61-SP1/0/KFBEFBFDMBEHJ
 - HTTP GET: dusanpancevac.rs/wp-content/.../2014/11/tus1.rtf (data) COMPROMISED SITE
 - HTTP GET: 141.105.141.87/3103uk11/DSHOUSE/41/7/4/
 - TLS: 178.18.172.215:4443 TLS: Subject='C=CN, ST=ST...'
 - HTTP GET: dynamicoffice.com.ar/.../tus1.rtf (data) COMPROMISED SITE
- Final Payload
 - YvxRoVPD.exe
 - VirusTotal Analysis Result: 3/56



Statistics of Upatre Campaigns

- 660,586 unique samples since first delivery
 - First Seen: 2013-02-17 8:05:04am
 - Last Seen: 2015-10-21 5:49:32am
- Primary Application Delivery Methods
 - SMTP
 - POP3
 - Web Browsing
 - IMAP
- 618 unique samples as of 9:00AM 2015/10/21
 - Unique samples; traditional Anti-Virus signatures



Analysis of a CryptoWall Campaign

- Drive-by Fiesta Exploit Kit
 - Compromised Site: http://www.dbmotive.com/ora-12545-connect-failed-because-target-host-or-object-does-not-exist
 - HTTP Redirect: http://rgfgnrrv.hopto.org/tdstest/ c1ba302e04a61816de2ec94839c5162f88/
 - HTTP Redirect: http://rgfgnrrv.hopto.org/j_86zfsy/66d441210667479c...
 (application/x-shockwave-flash)
 - HTTP Redirect: http://rgfgnrrv.hopto.org/j_86zfsy/43abe10cf7da0742...
 (application/x-silverlight)
- Payload CryptoWall v3.0
 - VirusTotal Analysis Result: 3/57



Statistics of CryptoWall Campaigns

8,306 unique samples since first delivery

First Seen: 2014-06-02 8:05:04am

Last Seen: 2015-10-21 5:31:49am

- Primary Application Delivery Methods
 - SMTP
 - Web Browsing
 - Flash Exploits
 - POP3
 - FTP
- 9 unique samples as of 9:00AM 2015/10/21
 - No traditional Anti-Virus signatures





Closed-loop Threat Prevention



Reduce the attack surface

- Whitelist applications or block high-risk apps
- Block known viruses, exploits
- Block commonly exploited file types



Detect the unknown


- Analysis of all application traffic
- SSL decryption
- WildFire sandboxing of exploitive files

3

Create protections

Detection and blocking of C&C via:

- Bad domains in DNS traffic
- URLs (PAN-DB)
- C&C signatures (anti-spyware)



Failed attempts

Successful delivery

Post-compromise activity

